

FIRING LINE - PROGRAM #143 - WM. BUCKLEY, JR.: NOAM CHOMSKY

Buckley: Professor Noam Chomsky is listed in anybody's catalogue as among the half-dozen top heroes of the New Left. This standing he achieved by adopting over the past two or three years a series of adamant positions projecting, at least, American foreign policy, at most, America itself. His essays and speeches are collected in his new book: *AMERICAN POWER AND THE NEW MANDARINS*. Usually, Mr. Chomsky writes non-political books, for instance, *Syntactic Structures* in 1967, *Cartesian Linguistics* in 1966, and *Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar* in 1965. He is a highly esteemed student of modern language and linguistics, who teaches nowadays at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and has taught before at Berkeley, Columbia and other strife-torn universities. He is a member of many organizations and learned societies, including, I am sure he would want me to mention, the Aristotelian Society of Great Britain.

Buckley: In one of his essays, Mr. Chomsky writes, quotes, by accepting the assumption of legitimacy of debate on certain issues, such as this one, one has already lost one's humanity. I should like to begin by asking him why, under the circumstances, if by being here he stands to lose his humanity, he consented to appear in the first place?

Chomsky: Because, first of all, I didn't quite put it in those terms, I don't think. I think that by, I think that there are, I said that there are certain issues, for example, Auschwitz, such that by consenting to discuss them, one degrades oneself and to some degree loses one's humanity, and I think that that's true. Nevertheless, I can easily imagine circumstances in which I would have been glad to debate Auschwitz. For example, if there were some chance that by debating Auschwitz, it might have been possible to eliminate or to at least mitigate the horror of what was going on. And I think I feel the same way about Vietnam. And I really think that there is no, fundamentally, there is no argument anymore, on an, at an intellectual level, in my opinion, but I think it's very important to discuss it, nevertheless.

Buckley: At what level is there an argument?

Chomsky: Well, there is a policy which I think is a destructive and devastating policy, it's continuing, and the continuation of the policy is to some extent based on the fact of public apathy or public acceptance, hence, there still is the necessity to convince people that they should act strongly to put an end to this policy.

Buckley: At what point was there an intellectual argument? At which point did an intellectual argument in favor of our intervening in Vietnam cease to exist?

Chomsky: Well as I say there, I think that there may have been a time when there was something to debate. For example, I think that in the middle fifties, though I was opposed to the policy, and I think it was right to be opposed to it, nevertheless, I think it was a debatable issue in a sense in which it is no longer a debatable issue.

Buckley: Why is that?

Chomsky: Because at the moment I think it's really an issue of the survival of the existence of Vietnam as an entity, as a social and cultural entity, I think that's what's at stake.

Buckley: But even that could be intellectually argued, couldn't it?

Chomsky: Well, in the same sense in which Auschwitz could be intellectually argued.

Buckley: No, I mean in a different sense.

Chomsky: No, I think in the same sense. In fact, don't forget there were people who argued in favor of Auschwitz, and gave...

Buckley: No, no, I haven't forgotten that at all. I haven't had any such on this program, nor do I intend to, but it seems to me that even if what you said were correct, there could be a perfectly legitimate argument over, for instance, the continuation of the state of Angilla (?) or the continuation of the state of Biafra, or the continuation of the state of Goa, couldn't there?

Chomsky: I didn't talk about the existence of the state, I talked about the existence of the society as a social and cultural entity.

Buckley: Yeah.

Chomsky: I think that's what's at stake.

Buckley: Okay. If that's at stake, mightn't there be two points of view about how to help it evolve into its natural forms, right?

Chomsky: Well, there are many different points of view, I think they're legitimate, they're very legitimate.

Buckley: Well, now, how can you say that?

Chomsky: You see, they're very legitimate issues that can be argued as to how the United States ought to most efficaciously put an end to its destructive action in Vietnam. There are many different alternatives that might be thought of.

Buckley: Yes, the one way of course to put an end to America's necessary intervention is to conclude the war successfully, that's a way, right?

Chomsky: Yeah, one possible way is by destroying Vietnam, which I think is the most likely outcome.

Buckley: Yeah. Well, for instance, one way in which we put an end to the Nazi occupation of France was by destroying Nazi Germany, right?

Chomsky: That's right.

Buckley: And it seems to me that this was a position which is a tenable position and *mutatis mutandis* XXXX position, today.

Chomsky: No, because *mutatis mutandis* changes everything.

Buckley: Well, I'll tell you why, I'll tell you why, because in this case, as you know, it's not only I, but people with whom I disagree, like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who refers to your theological certitudes and your liberal application of them to every subject in which you touch, so the subject of your own intolerance of other people's point of view is I think itself linguistically interesting.

Chomsky: Well, first of all, I don't accept that criticism. You see, if you look at that quotation, you'll notice that I put it in there and recall the context, I said that when I argue the issue, I feel a tone of moral and emotional falseness, which I want to explain. But then I go ahead to argue the issue. So, that's a side remark intended to explain my own feeling of emotional and moral falseness, which is real, I did feel it, but nevertheless I then go ahead for three hundred pages or so to discuss this and the related issues.

Buckley: Sure.

Chomsky: So, I don't really believe that it's fair to say that I'm not willing to tolerate other positions.

Buckley: Yeah, but the trouble is you don't end the book by saying I'm kind of odd in feeling this, you say everybody's odd who doesn't agree with me. Right?

Chomsky: No, I don't think so. Do I say that?

Buckley: Well, this is certainly the burden of your book.

Chomsky: I wasn't aware of that. I mean, I think that I've given you know an argument

BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY

Buckley: Well, maybe this is a universal difficulty you're having, not being aware of certain people's reading of your position.

Chomsky: Well, let me say, then, for example, I think I think I take a very qualified and temperate position on many, many issues in this book. For instance, take the issue of the background of the second World War, which I spent a lot of time on. If you notice, I end up with a statement saying that I don't see any way to give a clear, sharp resolution, clear, sharp answer to the question what we should have done under such and such circumstances. I discuss someone who did take a very strong, and I think a very honorable position, namely, A.J. Mustie, and I say I wish I could come out, I wish I could answer the question for myself, whether I feel that I would have taken or I would have rejected that position. But I don't see anyway to do it because the issue is mixed. On many issues I feel that way. On the other hand, you see, when the issue is, you know, let's say, 3 million tons of bombs dropped on Vietnam, I don't feel that way anymore. Nevertheless, I'm still perfectly willing to argue the issue. Calmly, quietly.

Buckley: As you would have, say, the dropping of the bombs in Dresden?

Chomsky: Exactly. Or the atom bomb, let's say.

Buckley: Yeah.

Chomsky: You see, I would have been willing to argue the dropping of the atom bomb, although I do feel that it's a war crime.

Buckley: Sure. But I do think that you put some people at a disadvantage by your a priori assertion that any position that disagrees with your own is intellectually barren.

Chomsky: Well, I didn't mean that really. Let me explain, maybe it didn't come across, but what I meant was something else. I wanted to honestly state my own emotional and my own feeling about entering into a debate over this issue.

Buckley: Port Noi (?) -wise?

Chomsky: No, I think that, the point is that I think it's only fair to an audience of readers to say that this is the way I approach the issue, and you read me on the basis of this understanding, the best I could give, as to the way I'm approaching this issue. And it's perfectly true that when I do, if you notice what I say is that increasingly over the years, in discussing this issue, I felt this feeling of emotional and moral falseness. And I think it would only be honest to express it, and then to go ahead with the discussion.

Buckley: Oh, quite so, but you also say that you hate yourself for not having come to that position earlier.

Chomsky: Yeah, I do. Because I think that was a very great, great mistake.

Buckley: Well, I hope to give you a little solace, in the course of the evening, but the reason I do raise this – and I rejoice in your disposition to argue the Vietnam question, especially when I recognize what an act of self-control this must involve.

Chomsky: It does, it really does, I mean, I think that' it's the kind of issue

BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY

Buckley: And you did very well, you did very well.

Chomsky: Sometimes I lose my temper, maybe not.

Buckley: Maybe not tonight. Because if you would, I,' d smash you in the goddam face (LAUGHTER) You say,

Chomsky: That's a good reason for not losing ones temper.

Buckley: You say the war is simply an obscenity, depraved act by weak and miserable men,

Chomsky: Including all of us, including myself, including every, that's the next sentence.

Buckley: Sure, sure, sure. Because you count everybody in the company of the guilty.

Chomsky: And think that's true. You see, one of the points

Buckley: Yeah, but this is in a sense a theological observation, isn't it?

Chomsky: No, I don't think so.

Buckley: Because (UNINTELLIGIBLE) if everybody's guilty of everything, then nobody's guilty of anything.

Chomsky: No, I don't believe that. You see, I think that, I think the point that I'm trying to make, and I think ought to be made is that the real, at least to me, I say this elsewhere in the book, what seems to me a very, in a sense, terrifying aspect of our society and other societies is the equanimity and the detachment with which sane, reasonable, sensible people can observe such events. I think that's more terrifying than the occasional Hitler, or Lemay, or other, that crops up. These people would not be able to operate were it not for this apathy and equanimity, and, therefore, I think that it is in some sense the sane, and reasonable, and tolerant people who share a very serious burden of guilt that they very easily throw on the shoulders of others who seem more extreme and more violent.

Buckley: No, I agree, but surely the emotional temperature of yourself, or myself or of other people is not in and of itself an index, an automatic index to the righteousness of emotions.

Chomsky: Certainly not, certainly not, and I didn't mean it to be cynical.

Buckley: People were approximately equally wrought up in the late thirties over whether or not America should help the western powers to defend themselves against the Axis powers, and I think it is incorrect to suppose that people of either side were necessarily right simply because they were exercised.

Chomsky: Oh, I would agree with that totally. There is no connection whatsoever between degree of emotion and degree of correctness.

Buckley: But as you understand the existing situation, it ought to be in your judgment a transparently evil thing that we are engaged in and you are derivatively concerned because there isn't, because there is not a shared sense of indignation, like your own.

Chomsky: Yeah. Right. Now, I don't say that I'm right because I am indignant, rather I say I think in this case I am right to be indignant, which is different. I have to prove that.

Buckley: You are right to be indignant if you are right.

Chomsky: That's right. And that has, to be demonstrated. That's why (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY) which is why I wrote dozens of pages of argument about it, which may or may not convince people. It convinces me.

Buckley: Sure, sure.

BREAK

Buckley: All right, let me again, excuse me, did I interrupt you? I'm sorry.

Chomsky: No, no, go ahead. Sure.

Buckley: Let me ask you this: if in fact your concern is to communicate your moral concern, to what extent have you spent time thinking about your techniques? Now, I say this seriously, because it is probably true that under certain circumstances the communication of one's own indignation and fury and restraint is best communicated emotionally, I think to one's own satisfaction by screaming and yelling. But if it becomes observable that this doesn't bring people around, then you've got to consider the problem of communication, which, it becomes a moral problem. Just as you would consent to argue Auschwitz, or Buchenwald, with somebody, if there was a chance of dissipating something of the sort. Now, if you have given that problem any thought, do you, how come that you end up saying, as you do in your book, that senator Mike Mansfield is, quote, the kind of man who is the terror of our age?

Chomsky: Well, let me put that in its context as well. What I say is, I believe that, and what I say is that senator Mansfield is an American intellectual in the best sense, a sane, reasonable scholarly man, the kind of man who is the terror of our age. And that is essentially what I was saying before. I think that the terror of our age is the

Buckley: The mass man

Chomsky: sane, responsible, serious, quiet man who watches these things unfold and doesn't react to them. And I include myself in that, as I tried to make clear in the earlier statements.

Buckley: Well, if, put it this way, your counsel is surely a counsel of despair, if on the one hand you accost us with your own relative moral superiority and yet end up despising yourself, appealing to scrupulosity, for your own shortcomings. And this makes things pretty unhappy.

Chomsky: Well, not when you, no, I don't feel any relative moral superiority. And I tried, maybe failed, but I tried very hard to express that in the book, that, I said somewhere in the beginning, that if there is any tone of self-righteousness, or anything like that it's unintended, and certainly undeserved, and I mean that, very much. So, I mean, after all, given the feelings that I have, which I've just expressed, you know, and which you perceive, I should be doing really strong things, which I don't think I am doing. So, there's no sense of moral superiority. And I'm not interested in simply, you know, throwing blame around, or giving people marks. I think that the beginning of wisdom in this case is to recognize something about what we stand for in the world, what we're doing in the world, and I think when we do recognize that we will feel an enormous sense of guilt, and I say somewhere in there that one should be very careful not to let confessions of guilt overcome the possibility of action. I say that confessions of guilt can be very good therapy, as they can. As is well known. They're also a very good preventative to action, and I think one should be very wary of that. In fact, if I remember

Buckley: Well, I think we should, I think that your formulation of it is at least saintly, but it still is a dislocating at least to people who fancy themselves as spending an equal amount of time attempting to refine their whole apparatus of moral discrimination and who come up with conclusions directly at variance with your own. Now, the reason I haven't asked you at this moment to say, you know, why are we in Vietnam, and so on and so forth, is because we have been all arguing about this for four, or five or six years, and the chances of our coming up with anything especially new are small.

Chomsky: That's one of the respects in which I think it is sort of an unarguable issue. Now, you know, the issues have just, one has been over and over and over them.

Buckley: Yeah. But there are perhaps certain aspects of the quarrel in Vietnam that touch especially on your thesis and your concern and the whole nature of it, and that is the

suspicion that some people have of a double standard, of selective indignation. For instance, you refer to heroic, heroic Vietnamese resistance to American power.

Chomsky: I think it's absolutely heroic.

Buckley: Yeah, sure. Now, I understand, I understand enough about language to understand the use of heroism in that way.

Chomsky: If you notice, there are a few lines below or above where I say something about quite apart from any question of politics.

Buckley: Sure. Sure. Now, suppose I were to write about the heroic resistance of the Nazis to the Liberation Army, for instance their use of torture, their use of mass reprisals,

Chomsky: I don't consider that heroic.

Buckley: Well, why isn't it heroic? I mean that they were doing everything they possibly could

Chomsky: Reprisals, no I don't think that's heroic

Buckley: Well, why not?

Chomsky: doesn't, well, then I think we do disagree on the use of language. I don't think that reprisals against

Buckley: We do know the Viet Cong have used fire weapons to destroy whole villages, children that they have disemboweled, Mayors, and so on and so forth, and hung them up and all that kind of stuff, now, this is heroic action.

Chomsky: No. That is not.

Buckley: Oh.

Chomsky: That's depraved.

Buckley: That's depraved.

Chomsky: In my opinion. But that's very very marginal with the Viet Cong.

Buckley: Well, why is it marginal?

Chomsky: In fact, it's marginal. That is a question of fact.

Buckley: In question of fact, yeah.

Chomsky: In fact, you know, I think there's perfect unanimity about this, in the people who have studied it. For example, if you look at someone like say, Douglas Pike, you know, American Foreign Service Agent is the chief expert on the Viet Cong. And you read his book carefully, you discover that he points out that it was in response to the American military effort that the Viet Cong turned from their attempt to build mass popular support by, through the organizational methods, that involved giving people an actual role in organizing and controlling their own society and institutions, they turned from that to physical force in reaction to the American intervention. And then if you read, there are many examples of this quoted in the book from AID documents, let's say, or from pacification manuals, where people pointed out

Buckley: Well, yeah, but by the same token you can say that the Nazis turned to torture in France in reaction to Eisenhower's landing in Normandy. The answer is that people so disposed to act are certain kinds of people, and I yearn for a recognition of this in your writings or in Douglas Pike's. As a matter of fact, Douglas Pike as you know, has certain difficulty with the fact that it is acknowledged that up to 25-30 thousand people were individually killed by terrorists before America's

Chomsky: When was that?

Buckley: the, it was between 1958 and 1962.

Chomsky: I think nine thousand is the figure that's given usually.

Buckley: Well, that

Chomsky: And it's interesting to see what it was, I mean, if one really wants to talk about Viet Cong terror during the period prior to American intervention, then again I think just about all commentators, Dennis Warner, Bernard Fall, whoever you like, has agreed that by and large this was terror directed extremely selectively against oppressive and external village officials sent in

Buckley: Well, the burning of Joan of Arc

Chomsky: Pardon?

Buckley: the burning of Joan of Arc was selective, too (LAUGHTER). But it was intended to establish a universal point,

Chomsky: It was intended to

Buckley: So was the execution of Eichmann selective.

Chomsky: Well, but you see there's a very big difference, I think, you see, if you want, personally, I'm against all kinds of terror, there's no question, but if you want to understand the Viet Cong situation, then, let's recognize a very great distinction, at least, I recognize, let's see what the political point of the terror was. Because after all there were, during that period, there were about nine or ten thousand, according to American, sources, there were 9 or 10 thousand village officials, of one sort or another, killed by the Viet Cong, largely with the support of the villagers, that's what, but at the same time, recall that there were perhaps 160,000 Vietnamese if we accept Bernard Fall's figures again, killed by the Saigon government and the Americans, this prior to 1965. That was a very different kind of terror both in quantity and also in its political (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY)

Buckley: Yeah, I know, but if the, it seems to me that you are attempting here to match things which are not which are not equal, should

Chomsky: Well, no, 9,000 and 160,000 are by no means equal.

Buckley: Yeah, I knew you'd say that, and I'm prepared to answer it. My point is that one presumably distinguishes between an act of terrorism which you called depraved, a moment ago,

Chomsky: well, what you described, burning the villages, is depraved.

Buckley: and a military action which is part of a military operation. (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY)

Chomsky: Which is even more depraved.

Buckley: Well, now, why do you say that?

Chomsky: Well, for example, you say, well, let me give you some examples of what I consider depraved.

Buckley: Yeah.

Chomsky: Malcolm Brown back in 1962 or 3, I don't remember, reported it was, I think, an AP or UP correspondent, reported that Saigon officials were sending American Sky Hawks, you know, airplanes over Vietnamese villages to wipe them out with Napalm raids in order to cover instances of graft, for example. Well, I think that's depraved. And I don't condemn that because, you see, just to mention this matter of double standards, there are really three kinds of terror in Vietnam. There's Viet Cong terror, there's the Saigon government terror and there's American terror. And if you'll read what I've written, I say practically nothing about either Vietcong terror or terror carried out by the Saigon government. Now, if

one wanted to talk about that, one would have to point out that the terror carried out by the Saigon government is incredibly greater in extent, and has a very different political purpose which one could discuss. But I restrict myself to discussing American terror.

Buckley: Yeah, well, I'd have to disagree with you on that generality, but I gather that you believe it, but go ahead.

Chomsky: yeah, I do, And we could, you know, then it does become a matter of fact which one could discuss. But I, as a matter of principle, almost, restrict myself to the discussion of American terror. Neither, not the terror carried out by the various sides in Vietnam, for many reasons. For one thing, because it's just qualitative difference in scale, and for another thing because I feel that we have some responsibility about it. You see I don't, in the same sense, I don't talk about, you know, I've never written about the terror carried out by both sides in Nigeria let's say. I don't like it, obviously, but I don't see any point in my giving them good or bad marks for it. On the other hand, if we were carrying out the terror, I would very definitely write about it. And I think, so, there's no double standard, as far as I can see. At least, let's say, I have a standard in mind, one may or may not accept it.

Buckley: We will explore that.

BREAK

Buckley: Mr. Chomsky, we're talking there about American terror, and I think you make a very accurate observation that we are responsible for what we do, but hardly responsible for what other people do, excepting so far as we are in a position to influence them. For instance, if there's a mass starvation in Biafra, even though we did not cause it, there is a sense in which we are responsible if we don't do something to attempt to alleviate it; now by the same token, if we are prepared to agree that it is not always easy to taxonomize military action into that which is a terroristic and that which is purely/military operation, we are left with doubts, for instance, about the bombing of Germany in 1942, '43, '44, you might contend that this was terroristic and unnecessary, and you might be right, although you're not a military expert, and neither am I, but I do

Chomsky: I think there's a point to that.

Buckley: Yeah. But I do judge that even if we all agree that what we did in Dresden was inexcusable as a moral question, it's got to be understood in the context of what it was that brought us to Dresden in the first instance.

Chomsky: Absolutely.

Buckley: And of what brought us to south Vietnam in the first instance, in my judgment, was clearly an uninterested, or I should say disinterested concern for the stability and

possibilities of a region of the world, to which we were committed by a series of (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY)

Chomsky: In what period do you feel that we had this disinterested relationship to Vietnam.

Buckley: Well, right now.

Chomsky: No, at what period did we have it, did it begin, let's say, in 1951 for example, when a state Department bulletin points that we must help the French reconquer their former colony? And we must eradicate all Vietnamese resistance down to its last roots in order to reestablish the French in power? Was that the reason?

Buckley: Well, I, personally, wish, to increase my vulnerability, I wish we had helped the French.

Chomsky: We did.

Buckley: But not sufficiently. There's no point in helping somebody insufficiently.

Chomsky: Well, but it's, it was hardly disinterested when we attempted as, you know, with tremendous support in fact to reinstate French imperialism in South Vietnam.

Buckley: It was disinterested in this sense, and I think this is an important distinction, which you do touch on in your book. It's a disinterested act if my attempt, or your attempt to help a particular nation, is in order to spare you the possibility of a greater ordeal in the future which will harm you, your family, your children, and (UNINTELLIGIBLE - BOTH TALKING)

Chomsky: In that sense, Nazi Germany was also disinterested, because after all, Nazi Germany was conquering Eastern Europe only in order to advance the values of Christian spiritual civilization, and to restore the Slavs to their rightful home, and so on and so forth.

Buckley: No, no, no, no. That's, look, I follow you, but if you want to pursue that digression, I will.

Chomsky: Okay.

Buckley: But, let's suspend it for a moment. I'm distinguishing that kind of disinterestedness with the kind

Chomsky: But that's not a kind of disinterestedness, you see, that's something which includes, as a special case, every case of military aggression and colonialism in history. It's all disinterested in your sense.

Buckley: Well, all right, let me simply rest my case by saying that there is an observable distinction by intelligent men with between a country that reaches out and interferes with the affairs of another country because it has reason to believe that a failure to do so will result in universal misery and that country which reaches out and interferes with other countries because it wants to establish Coca Cola plants there and Chase National Banks and whatever, and exploit it. Now, that is observable.

Chomsky: It's a conceptual (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY). Distinguish between a conceptual distinction and a factual distinction.

Buckley: Okay. All right. I'm prepared to do that.

Chomsky: It is a conceptual distinction, but in actual fact, the history of colonialism shows that these two motivations can coincide, that is practically every, I mean, there are exceptions, there is probably the Belgians in the Congo are an exception, but by and large the major imperialist ventures have been in the economic, in the material interest, or in the perceived material interest

Buckley: I'm not interested in the mathematics of the, I'm interested

Chomsky: Let me finish.

Buckley: You have already conceded that it is not merely a conceptual difference, you say that there are exceptions.

Chomsky: There are a few exceptions.

Buckley: All right. Okay. All right, let's talk about the exceptions then.

Chomsky: Well, nobody, now wait a minute, the exceptions, I mentioned for example, the Belgians in the Congo, there they didn't have, they didn't even pretend to have a civilizing mission; there was pure imperial self-interest, these are the exceptions. There are, as far as I know, no exceptions on the other side. There are, I mean I've left out a case of history, but as I see the history of colonialism, the great mass of cases are cases where a powerful country was working in its perceived material self-interest, and was covering what it was doing to itself and the world, with the very pleasant phrases about preserving Christian values, or helping the poor benighted natives, or one thing or another, Now there are a few exceptions, where there was pure predatory imperialism, no, not even any pretense of doing anything, but these are quite rare. (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY)

Chomsky: And we're in the mainstream of (BOTH TALKING) pure predatory imperialism

Buckley: Sure. This history of the Roman Empire

Chomsky: Well, let's take (BOTH TALKING) since the Industrial Revolution.

Buckley: Since the Industrial Revolution. Well, if you say the people who have refined the art of apologetics, I don't deny it, but it is also true and I think manifestly true, that there have been interferences with the affairs of other nations whose purposes were, in my judgment, manifestly benign.

Chomsky: For example?

Buckley: Well, for instance, the Truman Doctrine.

Chomsky: Oh, I don't think that was manifestly benign at all. That was an attempt to

Buckley: Well, the Greeks think it was benign

Chomsky: To develop an- the Greek situation was not benign at all.

Buckley: I say the Greeks' testimony is more interesting to me than yours.

Chomsky: Which Greek testimony? The testimony of these thousands of people that are thrown into jail, and these people

Buckley: Well, not, no, I grant not the testimony of the Greek Communists who were beaten.

Chomsky: Or the Greek peasants who were

Buckley: Well, there again, is it a conceptual difference that uh between the person who desires life under some kind of freedom, and one who desires life under some kind, under Communism?

Chomsky: Well, no, first, because there's no such opposition in Greece. There was a distinction between a very repressive regime which we instituted in 1946, and another regime I don't know what it would have been, that would have grown out of a victory of the so-called Communists. Now, if, you see, what we did had nothing to do with freedom. What we instituted

Buckley: This is absolute historical romanticism, because

Chomsky: Oh, I don't think so

Buckley: because the number of people who were slaughtered in Greece first by the Communist insurgency, then by the Nazis, then again, by the Communist (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY)

Chomsky: By the Communist conquest before the Nazis in Greece?

Buckley: The communist insurgency

Chomsky: Prior to the Nazis in Greece?

Buckley: Yes. The Civil War of the early 40s.

Chomsky: Prior to the Nazis?

Buckley: My point is that

Chomsky: Your history is quite (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY) there was no communist insurgency prior to the Nazis, there were Communist resistance bands, who fought against the Nazis.

Buckley: Well, this is a matter of mx nomenclature, the point is that the 40-year-old, or the 45-year-old Greek has fought three times in certain ventures they, in one of which they acknowledged that we bailed them out.

Chomsky: Well, who is they? Who is they? The rulers of Greece acknowledge that.

Buckley: No, and also the people.

Chomsky: Oh, I'm quite unaware of that. I'm quite unaware that the people of Greece have spoken on this issue.

Buckley: Why even Papandreou, and you like him, I assume, because he hates us.

Chomsky: No, not at all. George Papandreou is one of the people who was

Buckley: I'm talking about Andreas which makes even

Chomsky: Is Andreas Papandreou's (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY)

Buckley: Both very, both on record as being grateful to President Truman for his intervention in that part of the world in 1947.

Chomsky: In that case, I disagree with them on that issue. I, mean, I think we had no right to intervene in Greece in 1947.

Buckley: Now, we're talking about rights. Which gets us away from the discussion.

Chomsky: All right. Right. Let's talk about whether (BOTH TALKING)

Buckley: The discussion is whether or not, whether or not, there is such a thing as relatively disinterested international interference, and it seems to me that America's record is rather good. If we went through an imperialist phase, we pulled out of it faster than any country in the history of civilization.

Chomsky: I don't, I think we're very deeply embedded

Buckley: Why did we pull out of the Philippines for instance?

Chomsky: We pulled out of the Philippines because it became a bad investment.

Buckley: Why?

Chomsky: Because American, America, if you look, American agricultural interests were very much opposed, back in the mid-thirties, they were very strongly opposed to the free trade relationships which allowed Philippine crops to compete with them. That's why we pulled out of the Philippines.

Buckley: Well, why do these agricultural interests authorize us to intervene in South Vietnam?

Chomsky: Well, they didn't.

Buckley: If you consider this as the critical dimension.

Chomsky: Because we didn't intervene on the basis. No, I say that in the Philippines it was the critical dimension. Look, the world is a complex place.

Buckley: I'm aware of that. (LAUGHTER)

Chomsky: There are certain interests that were involved.

Buckley: M.I.T. is a complex place.

Chomsky: Well, there were certain interests that were involved in our Philippine venture. There are different interests that are involved in our Vietnam venture. You see, our Vietnam, don't forget that with the second World War America's imperial interests expanded

enormously. I mean, prior to the Second World War, we were sort of a marginal imperialist power, except for the Monroe Doctrine. But since the second world War, we have become the world's major imperialist power. And Vietnam is simply one piece of an attempt to construct a very large integrated world system of which Greece was another piece.

Buckley: Yeah, we became an imperial power, Mr. Chomsky, in this sense: in the sense that we inherited primary responsibility for any change of action that might involve us in a Third World War.

Chomsky: I don't believe that.

Buckley: And something that might involve the entire world in holocaust, and under the circumstances,

Chomsky: No, I don't believe that, Mr. Buckley.

Buckley: Well, I know you don't believe it.

Chomsky: In fact, I think that our

Buckley: But, it might be refreshing from the listeners' point of view, which is that there are people who do believe that America, unhappily, and certainly not desiring it, inherited the responsibility for trying to abort international holocaust, and has from time to time done so by such ventures as the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Aid, and things like that.

Chomsky: No, I don't agree with that:

Buckley: Is Marshall Aid not disinterested?

Chomsky: No, Marshall Aid is quite different. First of all, Marshall

BREAK

Buckley: I interrupted you, I'm sorry

Chomsky: Yeah. Well, first of all, you've now mentioned Marshall for the first time, and Marshall Aid, Marshall Plan Aid has to be distinguished quite sharply from the Truman Doctrine.

Buckley: Why?

Chomsky: Why? Because the Truman Doctrine was a doctrine of military intervention and the Marshall Plan was our first attempt at a major (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY)

Buckley: But we do understand that

Chomsky: Now, just a minute.

Buckley: sometimes a soldier can be as useful as a bushel of wheat, don't you?

Chomsky: Now, look, nevertheless, if we're going to be at all clear about the American role, we're certainly going to distinguish between military intervention and economic intervention. They're very different in the way they function. Now, the fact of the matter is that neither was disinterested in your sense, I don't think. But they're very different in the impact that they had. Uh, the Truman Doctrine, I think, was a disastrous venture. I think the Marshall Plan was arguable. I mean, One understood what it was for. I don't agree with the consequences

Buckley: Well, how do you explain the schizophrenia of a public which willed both more or less simultaneously? On the one hand you state the public is incapable of acting disinterestedly (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY)

Chomsky: The public didn't will either.

Buckley: Well, the government, the government, all right, the government.

Chomsky: Well, the government, because both were

Buckley: Well, the government backed by the public, how's that? How do you explain that the same government on Monday did the Truman Doctrine, which you consider simply as sort of being a projection of the evil impulses of the government, and on Tuesday do something that you consider to be very good? What's happened to the government between Monday and Tuesday?

Chomsky: I didn't say I consider, just a moment, first of all, I didn't say I considered it to be very good, I said it's rather different and one has to bring different standards to bear in evaluating it.

Buckley: Well, why is it different? Give me an example. Suppose you're a farmer, and you need agriculture, you need fertilizer, so you apply to me for fertilizer, but just before I get it to you, somebody comes up with a bayonet and is about to make it impossible for you to (BOTH TALKING) for farming? Now, in that particular instance is there a strategic difference between my giving you the fertilizer and my giving, the soldier routs the (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY)

Chomsky: You're talking about the dream world. The real world is one, because the real world is one in which the alternatives were bringing, coming with a bayonet which is on an American rifle, held by an American-backed Greek soldier, and the alternative to that was

giving the kind of aid which was used in fact to construct the kind of society in western Europe that we wanted to see developed there. Now, these are two very different things. It's a very different thing to introduce, to run for the Greek army a counter-insurgency program with military support and many military men involved, that's one kind of thing, one sort of repression imposed on the Greek population through American intervention. One might argue whether it is right or wrong, but that's to be, to be very sharply distinguished

Buckley: Why do you say imposed? Is it because your presumption here

Chomsky: My presumption is (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY)

Buckley: your presumption is that the Greeks would like the kind of regime which resulted

Chomsky: No, look, my assumption, is that all intervention is imposed by any country. That is, I believe that quite generally

Buckley: Well, did we impose on the French when we liberated them from the Nazis? Was that an imposition?

Chomsky: We didn't conquer France. We moved

Buckley: The hell we didn't!

Chomsky: from an outside invading force.

Buckley: We invaded France.

Chomsky: But we didn't conquer it from its own people. You see, in Greece we were trying to conquer it from its own people.

Buckley: But there you're willing to credit the anti-Nazis as their own people, but you're not in Greece willing to credit the anti-Communists as their own people.

Chomsky: The German army was there, there was no outside army in Greece other than ours.

Buckley: Look, there are modalities in outside intervention

Chomsky: Look. There's a very sharp difference between, now, just a minute, there's a very sharp difference

Buckley: LaValle was not a Nazi.

Chomsky: But Laval would not have lasted for five minutes without the German army.

Buckley: And nor would Zachariadis have lasted for five minutes without the help of Russian aid.

Chomsky: But, wait a minute, but no Russian troops, no Russian troops

Buckley: The fact is, you know when Stalin got tired of Zachariadis he pulled out.

Chomsky: Now look, let's be careful again. I mean, there's a difference, first of all, I'm opposed to military aid to other countries, whether by us or the Soviet Union.

Buckley: Why?

Chomsky: Well, let's come back to that, because there is a more important thing, and that is that I'm even far more opposed to the imposition of regimes by foreign troops. Now, in the case of Germany let's say, in the case of France, the Petain-Laval government, the Vichy government was supported by German troops. Had the German mili- they weren't throughout the country necessarily, because there was certainly indigenous support, but there's no question that if German military force had been withdrawn the other side of the Rhine then there would have been an overthrow of the Vichy government, then France would have had some different form of government. Now, in that case, our invasion of France was, whether one likes it or not, was in reaction to an occupying, external force. It's just pure confusion to identify that with the case of Greece, when we were trying to liberate, we were trying to select the kind of society that Greeks would have, and we were trying to save the rulers that we had designated as appropriate from their own population. There were no outside forces.

Buckley: But don't you realize that in your book, and elsewhere, you're not willing to be consistent in carrying out this argument. You're constantly talking about our satellizing places like Cuba and the Dominican Republic and so on and so forth, and yet we never occupied them in the sense in which you're talking about.

Chomsky: Well, we never occupied the Dominican Republic? We sent 25,000 troops there in 1965, in an occupation move.

Buckley: No, no, I'm talking about pre-, I'm talking about

Chomsky: Well, the American Marines were in there dozens of times (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY)

Buckley: All right, I think you're being evasive on that. I don't think you want to be.

Chomsky: No, no, not at all, it is not evasive at all.

Buckley: Let me ask you, is it possible

Chomsky: I mean, we just simply, repeatedly sent troops to Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, et cetera, et cetera.

Buckley: Is it possible to satellize a nation without having an occupying army there?

Chomsky: Yes it is.

Buckley: All right. Then there goes your French, your tedious French explanation, I would say, because

Chomsky: No, not at all. Because that doesn't happen to be, you see, we're talking about a real situation, we could talk about some ideal situation, and, you know, have an academic discussion, (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY)

Buckley: I'm saying therefore it is possible for North Vietnam to satellize South Vietnam presumably without even occupying it militarily in any formal sense.

Chomsky: It's logically possible, but it didn't happen.

Buckley: Well, this is an argument concerning which there are two points of view, historically.

Chomsky: Well, let's discuss it, then. There's much more, if you want to be serious about it, there's more evidence that South Vietnam tried to colonize North Vietnam, than conversely. In fact, South Viet-, well, look, South Vietnamese commandoes were going, military forces, regular military forces, were going north considerably earlier than the time when we even proclaimed that the infiltration began from north to south.

Buckley: Did they bump into the refugees coming south? (LAUGHTER)

Chomsky: The refugees were coming south, were going both directions in fact in 1964 and '65, and according, at least according to Bernard Faul, the commandoes began going north in '56 or '57, the first claimed infiltration from the north was in '59, and that was South Vietnamese coming south. So, you know, if one wants to talk about, again, the real world, the first

Buckley: Yeah, but the trouble is your difficulty, Mr. Chomsky, is you never know when neatly to begin your historical sequence, there.

Chomsky: Well, you choose the point of beginning, then.

Buckley: Look, the point really is that if you're starting to say that 1959 was a provocation because it was

Chomsky: No, it wasn't a provocation, (BOTH TALKING) claimed that the provocation began.

Buckley: I say, well, but how about the people who were going from north to south, who were talking about the misery that had been going on, and so on and so forth.

Chomsky: When? When was that?

Buckley: I mean,

Chomsky: Well, which people are you talking about; I don't know.

Buckley: Well, I'm talking about the Vietnamese. North and South.

Chomsky: The Vietnamese North and South

Buckley: Your (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY) is neatly captured in the remark made recently by Czechoslovakia, that Czechoslovakia is, after all, the most neutralist country in the world, since it declines to interfere even with its own internal affairs, and

Chomsky: I'm afraid I don't see the relevancy of your point.

Buckley: Well, the relevance is, very simply, that you start your line of discussion at a moment that is historically useful for you

Chomsky: That's what I say, you pick the beginning.

Buckley: The grand fact of the postwar world is that the Communists, the Communist imperialists, by the use of terrorism, by the use of, by deprivation of freedom, have contributed to the continuing bloodshed, and the sad thing about it is not only the bloodshed but the fact that they seem to dispossess you of the power of rationalization.

Chomsky: May I say something?

Buckley: Sure.

Chomsky: I think that's about five per cent true. And about or maybe 10 per cent true. It certainly is

Buckley: Why do you give that?

Chomsky: May I complete a sentence?

Buckley: Sure.

Chomsky: It's perfectly true that there were areas of the world, and in particular Eastern Europe, where Stalinist imperialism very brutally took control and still maintains control. But there are also very vast areas of the world where we were doing the same thing. And there's quite an interplay in the cold war. You see they, what you just described is I believe a mythology about the cold war, which might have been tenable ten years ago, but which is quite inconsistent with contemporary scholars,

Buckley: Ask a Czech.

Chomsky: Ask a Guatemalan, ask a Dominican, ask the President of the Dominican Republic, ask, you know, ask a person from South Vietnam, ask a (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY)

Buckley: Well, I would say, if you can't distinguish between the nature of our venture in Guatemala and the nature of the Soviet Union's in Prague, then we have real difficulty.

BREAK

Buckley: Mr. Greenfield.

Greenfield: Mr. Chomsky, you stated in one of the essays in your book, the unpleasant fact is that if one wishes to pursue the Munich analogy, there is only one plausible candidate for the role of Hitler, and by that you mean the United States. There are other references to Nazi Germany's conduct of foreign policy and our own. And you also less emphatically suggest that a lot of the internal policies of the United States Government have left millions of its own citizens hungry, or exploited them. If this is the fact, that is to say, if the nature of our society is functionally indistinguishable from Nazi Germany, then doesn't that legitimate any tactic that one wishes to use in opposition?

Chomsky: Well, I certainly don't believe that your assumption, that is, I don't believe, and I don't think I ever say there, society is functionally indistinguishable from Nazi Germany.

Greenfield: No, no, that's all, I want to zero in

Chomsky: What I say is that if one wants to pursue

Greenfield: I want to zero in.

Chomsky: Yeah. So, I would disagree with this assumption.

Greenfield: If by blowing up a troop train we prevent five thousand American soldiers from going to Vietnam to participate in what you do explicitly call a criminal war, isn't that a moral act?

Chomsky: Oh, I think that, yes, it would be. If sabotage would in fact contribute to ending the war, I would be in favor of sabotage. And let me give you concrete examples,

Greenfield: So, that's a tactical decision, not a moral one.

Chomsky: A tactical decision. In fact, I'll give you some examples, what the Barrigans have done for example, at Tatensville, in Milwaukee, I think is very heroic and in fact, saintly.

Greenfield: But that is not killing American soldiers.

Chomsky: Oh, no, I'm not, oh, you were talking about sabotage, blowing up American troop train.

Greenfield: Blowing up an American troop train. I would assume there would be loss of life.

Chomsky: I'm sorry. I thought you meant, let's say, stop, preventing a train from going. I'd be

Greenfield: I meant, I mean sabotage, assassination,

Buckley: Blow the tracks but not the people.

Greenfield: you know, what all the heroes in America

Chomsky: I would first of all make a sharp distinction, as for example, the Berrigans did, between attacks on property and attacks on people.

Greenfield: That's what I want to know.

Chomsky: Fundamental distinction. But then, you see, if one raises the question about attacks on people, then I think there are very tricky issues. You see, one would, I can conceive, you know, I would have been against assassinating Hitler, for example, because I'm against murder, but if I believed that assassination of Hitler would have really contributed to the end of the war, I think one could have given an argument. Now, if ---was true

Greenfield: In _____ pretendus Lyndon Johnson?

Chomsky: Now that would pertain to Lyndon Johnson. But, in neither case incidentally do I

think (BOTH TALKING) would have and

Buckley: Miss Hockman.

Hockman: I would like to ask Mr. Buckley what he thinks the motives of the people who are in favor of the war in Vietnam are. Putting it very simply, how can we possibly hope to help universal misery when we're so miserable here?

Buckley: Well, I think we're less miserable here. I mean, I'm, you may not be a happy young lady, but I'm sure you're not as miserable as you would be if for instance you didn't have a free press, if you weren't able to write such you poetry as you want to write, if you couldn't join a labor union, if you couldn't express yourself as you like, if your, the Mayor of your town might be disemboweled. I think there observable differences

Greenfield: Aren't you in favor of it?

Buckley: between the n ture between what freedom you have here, or put it this way, between your misery and theirs. I would prefer your misery.

Chomsky: If you wouldn't have saturation bombing take place

Buckley: sure, sure.

Hockman: Well, I want to disagree with you, for the moment, because I think there is a certain condition, a human condition, a condition of guilt, which Mr. Chomsky speaks about, and which to me is the most interesting point of his argument. The guilt that we feel here, which in a way may keep people from writing poetry, or from writing anything that they think because they're absolutely stifled by the climate of guilt.

Buckley: They manage to write their complaints and get on the best-seller list.

Hockman: Excuse me.

Buckley: They manage to write their complaints and get on the best-seller lists.

Hockman: But I know of many people who are not writing now because of the War in Vietnam, who are not functioning because of their guilt.

Buckley: Well, it's not an aspect of my responsibility to foreign policy to encourage you to externalize your complaints. But if you want to, there are any number of book publishers, magazine publishers, and radio stations, television stations, who will gladly hear them out, which I think is qualitatively different from what exists for instance in North Vietnam.

Greenfield: Or South.

Chomsky: Or Greece, for example, or Brazil, or dozens of other countries.

Buckley: Well, not quite so much, a little bit less so, sure.

Chomsky: Less so?

Buckley: I think it's true.

Chomsky: No.

Hockman: Then publishing would be only motive

Buckley: What's true is that a nation at war does not have the same liberties as a nation at peace. Abraham Lincoln suspended the right to habeas corpus and the oldest parliament in the history of the world didn't have an election for eleven years, during their war.

Chomsky: Yes, but if you compare the state of freedom in North and South Vietnam prior to the war as some people have done like Joseph Buttinger, I'm afraid it doesn't come out the way you like.

Buckley: Well, I think it does come out the way I like.

Chomsky: Not by the evidence that's been

Buckley: Ask the refugees, who, or the number of refugees who left North Vietnam and compare them with those who left south Vietnam.

Chomsky: That's a very different issue. What I said, what I was talking about was the right of free expression in North and South Vietnam. I mean, take a look for, example at Buttinger's analysis. You know, where he runs through cases. Quite apart from that, take a look at, for example, again, you know, pick your authority, let it be Bernard Faul, let it be almost anyone you like. You see, there was a great amount of village democracy, which was instituted in North Vietnam, and in fact has also been instituted in the NLF dominated areas of South Vietnam, which is something qualitatively different than anything that has existed in Asian societies before. And this exists simultaneously with, let me be quite clear, this exists simultaneously with a good deal of repression and certainly ___ civil liberties of the sort that we're used to.

Buckley: Mr. Chomsky, this is one of the most libertarian constitutions in the history of the world was written by the Soviet Union, (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY)

Chomsky: I'm not talking about constitutions.

Buckley: So, my point is what kind of freedom is experienced by somebody in North Vietnam, the answer is that their freedom was perpetually insecure.

Chomsky: Oh, well, you don't know that.

Buckley: Well, Ho Chi Minh himself has wept over the occasional necessity to kill 40 or 50 thousand of his own people.

Chomsky: Not the necessity, the occasional fact. But just one moment

Buckley: I was being sarcastic.

Chomsky: Yeah. What I was talking about, yeah, not only sarcastic, but also wrong. You see, it's very important to recognize, if you want to understand what communism means in Southeast Asia, to realize that along with many authoritarian and repressive practices, which I certainly don't condone, there is on the side, a great deal of democratization. There's been a liberation of energies and involvement,

Buckley: I think that's utter nonsense, if I may say so.

Chomsky: I don't think you're right.

Buckley: After all, the great paradigm of Red China in which the AFL-CIO itself concedes to something in the neighborhood of 20-million victims on that particular

Chomsky: Oh, come.

Buckley: I'm talking according to them.

Chomsky: The AFL-CIO

Buckley: (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY) they didn't have a commission.

Chomsky: No one has claimed a million people killed through Chinese communist purges, absolutely no one, no one serious, at least.

Buckley: Well, it was published in the New Leader, which, (BOTH TALKING)

Chomsky: Yes, of course, the New Leader might, but I'm talking

Buckley: (BOTH TALKING) the CIA planted.

Chomsky: Well, I said no one serious. Take a look at the China Journal, take a look at the China Courier.

Buckley: Well, I consider this (BOTH TALKING)

Chomsky: You see, I think you're missing the point, really, and I think it's an important point. You see, in looking at China one has to recognize a great deal of repressive practice, a great deal of authoritarianism. And one also has to recognize a great deal of spontaneous democratic structure of a sort which never existed in Asia before, and if you want to know the truth, doesn't even exist in our society. Now, these things exist side by side.

Buckley: If you read *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* you'll find that there's an extraordinary democratic structure inside concentration camps, but it seems that it is almost profane to make this observation.

Chomsky: No, look, I think it is profane to make that analogy. Because I'm talking about true democracy which is

Buckley: I don't think so.

Chomsky: Look, in which people, in which the peasants who live in a village control the institutions of their lives.

Buckley: Look,

Chomsky: They control the organizations

Buckley: And if you want to get out, you bump into the Berlin wall, on either side of the iron curtain.

Chomsky: There's no Berlin wall in China, to my knowledge.

Buckley: There is the equivalent of the Berlin wall. There's the sea and there's starvation, and there are concentration camps.

Chomsky: No, there has, you see, that's just the point, you see, starvation has been very largely overcome in China.

Buckley: Yeah, because they have something like 94% of the people working on agriculture. But I think Mr. Doxey has a question.

Chomsky: They also happen to have had two bumper crops in the last year.

Doxey: Professor Chomsky, when you say as you said about 30 minutes ago that there was a relativity of truth between nations,

Chomsky: A relativity of truth? I don't know

Doxey: would you classify, a relativity of truth, you said, in the international scene.

Chomsky: I don't understand the comment, if I said it, I don't know what it means.

Doxey: Well, would you call yourself a political (LAUGHTER) would you call yourself a political relativist?

Chomsky: I don't understand the concept.

Doxey: Well, put it this way: do you believe in a natural law? In transcendental truth, lets say, affixing social unit union

Chomsky: I think that there's something to the doctrine of natural law, but I think that thats much more abstract than, anything we've been discussing here.

Doxey: well, but wouldn't that then justify the use of terror in, let's say, stopping a tenet of the natural law from being broken, or stopping let's say

Chomsky: Let's bring it down to earth. I say, I'm of course opposed to terror. Any rational person is. But I think that if we're serious about the question of terror, serious about violence, we have to recognize that it is a tactical and hence moral matter, incidentally, tactical issues are basically moral issues. They have to do with human consequences. And if we're interested in let's say diminishing the amount of violence in the world, it's at least arguable and perhaps even sometimes true that a terroristic act does diminish the amount of violence in the world. Hence, a person who is opposed to violence will not be opposed to that terroristic act.

Greenfield: Walt Rostow says exactly the same thing.

Chomsky: That's right.

Buckley: Yeah.

Chomsky: He happens to be wrong in the case in which he applies it. You see, these principles tell you very little about real cases.

Greenfield: No, but that's what, I must say that's the one thing that bothers me more about what you've, been saying than the way you write. That that kind of language that it is the notion of the terroristic act which restricts the consequent violence is precisely what Rostow says in the View from the Seventh Floor, when after this whole analysis about the moral world, he says there's not a single place where we don't have major military might to support it.

Chomsky: I think that the real point here is that when you try to formulate general principles that will apply to arbitrary political affairs you find very, you can only make very vacuous and empty statements. You see, if one wants to talk in perfect abstraction from any real situation about the justification for violence and terror, then you come up with platitudes and empty remarks and so on. The point is that you know there are no very general principles that apply to such circumstances, or if there are no one has enunciated and formulated them. So, what one really has to do is look at the concrete historical situation. Now, where I would disagree, maybe Walt Rostow and I would agree at this level of abstraction on the use of violence to prevent less, greater violence. Where we would disagree is in our evaluation of what is happening in this country's historical situation. And that's where one's attention ought to be.

Buckley: So, therefore you have no philosophical objection to the way in which Mr. Rostow states his case, merely to its applicability to existing circumstances?

Chomsky: No, I say, at this level, I might not, I don't know what he says about that.

Buckley: But you would in other things?

Chomsky: But in other things I have very great differences. For example, Walt Rostow says that we should try to, that the great threat of China to us is that it will succeed, and provide a model to other countries, and we have to make sure that that doesn't happen (BOTH TALKING)

Buckley: Is that why you kept him out of M.I.T.?

Chomsky: I, I assure I had nothing to do with keeping him out of MIT. I'd be delighted to have him back, he's a great help to us, when he was.

Buckley: Thank you very much, Mr. Chomsky, and thank you all.

THEME

END OF TAPE